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ARTICLE
"Out of the Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems and
the Law of Armed Conflict
Michael N. Schmitt* &Jeffrey S. Thurnher**
I. Introduction
The introduction of autonomous weapon systems into the
"battlespace" will profoundly influence the nature of future warfare. This
reality has begun to draw the attention of the international legal
community. Most notably, in November 2012, Human Rights Watch
released Losing Humaniy: The Case against Killer Robots.' The report is a
scathing critique of autonomous weapons systems and has sparked a lively
and important debate over the lawfulness of taking humans "out of the
loop" during lethal targeting.2
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University Law School (UK). This Article derives in part from Michael N. Schmitt,
Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV.
NAT'L. SEC.J. FEATURES (2013), http://harvardnsj.org/wp-
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necessarily representing those of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other government
entity.
** Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army, Military Professor, International Law
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1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS
(2012) , available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf [hereinafter
LOSING HUMANITY].
2 On the issue of the legality of autonomous weapon systems, see Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The
Law that Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS 4 (Jan. 18, 2013),
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight130118.pdf; Kenneth Anderson & Matthew
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, 176 POL. REV. (Dec. 1, 2012),
http:/ /www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/ 135336; Markus Wagner,
Taking Humans Out of the Loop. Implications for International Humanitarian Law, 2 1 J. L. INFO. &
Copyright C 2013 by the Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, Michael Schmitt and
Jeffrey Thurnher.
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Human Rights Watch's position on "robots," a colloquial rendering for
autonomous weapon systems, is forceful and unambiguous: "[F]ully
autonomous weapons would not only be unable to meet legal standards but
would also undermine essential non-legal safeguards for civilians." 3 The
organization accordingly concludes that they "should be banned and ...
governments should urgently pursue that end." 4
This conclusion has important national security implications. The
United States and its allies have a substantial interest in maintaining a
technological edge over potential adversaries, in particular by fielding
systems that enable them to deliver lethal force while minimizing the risk to
their own forces. After all, the objective of warfare is to achieve and exploit
advantages to the enemy's detriment. Sensitive to this reality, the law of
armed conflict has never been about ensuring a "fair fight"; rather, it
comprises prohibitions, restrictions, and obligations designed to balance a
State's interest in effectively prosecuting the war (military necessity) with its
interest in minimizing harm to those involved in a conflict (humanity). The
question for the legal community, therefore, is whether autonomous weapon
systems comply with the legal norms that States have put in place to achieve
this balance. Any misinterpretation or misapplication of said norms will
necessarily skew this delicate balance, thereby placing compliance by States
with the law of armed conflict at risk.
Furthermore, as has too often been the case with international calls
to ban particular weapons, debates over weapons have had a way of getting
off-course, both normatively and operationally. At least from the United
States government's perspective, this tendency contributed to its
unwillingness to become Party to the Ottawa Antipersonnel Land Mines
and the Dublin Cluster Munitions Conventions. 6 A contemporary example
SC. 155. 155 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1874039.
3 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
4 Id. at 2.
5 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Militay Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian
Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA.J. INT'L L. 795 (2010).
6 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211;
Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357. Although the United
States elected not to become Party to the Ottawa Convention, the Obama Administration
is presently reviewing its position on the matter. Andrew J. Shapiro, Briefing on the Release of
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presaging the emerging controversy over autonomous weapon systems is the
polemic over drones, which has often been counter-normative and counter-
factual.7 Rather than allowing the discourse over autonomous weapon
systems to similarly spiral out of control, what is needed is a vibrant,
informed, measured, and mature discussion of the relevant legal issues.
This Article is intended to help infuse granularity and precision into
the legal debates surrounding such weapon systems and their future uses. It
suggests that whereas some conceivable autonomous weapon systems might
be prohibited as a matter of law, the use of others will be unlawful only
when employed in a manner that runs contrary to the law of armed
conflict's prescriptive norms governing the "conduct of hostilities." 8 This
Article concludes that an outright ban of autonomous weapon systems is
insupportable as a matter of law, policy, and operational good sense.
Indeed, proponents of a ban underestimate the extent to which the law of
armed conflict, including its customary law aspect, will control autonomous
weapon system operations. 9 Some autonomous weapon systems that might
the Tenth Edition of the "To Walk the Earth in Safety" Report, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/179143.htm. For the U.S. position on cluster
munitions, see U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CLUSTER MUNITIONS,
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c25930.htm (last visited March 21, 2013).
7Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems (Armed Drones) and International
Humanitarian Law: Simpifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 B.U. INT'L L.J. 595, 596 (2012).
8 The phrase "conduct of hostilities" refers in particular to "attacks," as that term is
understood in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I. Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts, art. 49, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
I]. The core conduct of hostility rules are set forth in Part IV, Section I, of the Protocol.
Although the United States is not a Party to the Protocol, most of the rules contained in the
Section reflect customary international law.
9 We refer to the following non-binding compilations of customary international
humanitarian law rules to draw conclusions as to customary status of the norms referenced
in this article: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck
eds., 2005) [hereinafter CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY];
MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL
ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY (2006),
available at
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/ The% 20Manual% 2 0n%20the% 20Law% 200f% 20
NIAC.pdf; PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH AT
HARVARD UNIVERSITY (HPRC), COMMENTARY ON THE MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2010) [hereinafter AMW MANUAL
COMMENTARY], TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt gen. ed., 2013 forthcoming) [hereinafter TALLINN
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be developed would already be unlawful per se under existing customary law,
irrespective of any treaty ban. The use of certain others would be severely
limited by that law.
Furthermore, an outright ban is premature since no such weapons
have even left the drawing board.' 0 Critics typically either fail to take
account of likely developments in autonomous weapon systems technology
or base their analysis on unfounded assumptions about the nature of the
systems. From a national security perspective, passing on the opportunity to
develop these systems before they are fully understood would be
irresponsible. Perhaps even more troubling is the prospect that banning
autonomous weapon systems altogether based on speculation as to their
future form could forfeit their potential use in a manner that would
minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects when compared to non-
autonomous weapon systems.
II. Understanding Autonomous Weapon Systems
Before turning to the law, it is essential to examine the operational
and technological context in which that law will be applied. The starting
point for any such discussion is definitional. A "weapon system" consists of a
weapon and the items associated with its employment." An example is an
MANUAL]. Additionally, although they are not compilations of customary international law,
scholars and practitioners often look to the Rome Statute and the U.S. Commander's
Handbook as strong indications of a norm's customary status, the latter in light of the
United States' Additional Protocol I non-Party status. Statute of the International Criminal
Court,July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.S. NAVY/U.S.
MARINE CORPS/U.S. COAST GUARD, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A (2007),
available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-4779-9925-
Odefea93325c/I1-14MJul_2007)_(NWP) [hereinafter COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
10 The International Committee of the Red Cross sagely suggests taking time to analyze
carefully the legal and other issues surrounding autonomous weapon systems before
drawing conclusions as to their lawfulness. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS 40 (Report of the 31st Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent,
Geneva, Switzerland 31IC/11/5.1.2 2011) , available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-
conference/3 1 -int-conference-ihl-challenges-report- 11-5-1-2-en.pdf [hereinafter ICRC
REPORT].
11 In this Article, we use the term "weapon system" as shorthand to refer both to a weapon
and a complete weapon system.
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F- 16 fighter-bomber armed with a Joint Direct Attack Munition JDAM)
bomb.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has defined an autonomous
weapon system as:
A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage
targets without further intervention by a human operator.
This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon
systems that are designed to allow human operators to
override operation of the weapon system, but can select and
engage targets without further human input after activation.12
The crux of full autonomy, therefore, is the capability to identify, target, and
attack a person or object without human interface. Although a human
operator may retain the ability to take control of the system, it is capable of
operating on its own. Of course, a fully autonomous system is never entirely
human-free. Either the system designer or an operator would at least have
to program it to function pursuant to specified parameters, and an operator
would have to decide to employ it in a particular battlespace.
Fully autonomous weapon systems must be distinguished from other
categories of weapons with lesser degrees of autonomy, which Human
Rights Watch has not suggested banning. For instance, U.S. forces have
operated two "human-supervised" autonomous systems for many
years-the Aegis at sea and the Patriot on land-both designed to defend
against short notice missile attacks.' 3 Another human-supervised
12 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., Directive 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14 (Nov.
2, 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300009p.pdf
[hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09]. Human Rights Watch distinguishes three
categories of systems. A "human-in-the-loop" system requires a human to direct the system
to select a target and attack it. The Department of Defense labels these "semi-autonomous
systems." A "human-on-the-loop" weapon is one in which the system selects targets and
attacks them, albeit with human operator oversight. The Department of Defense term is
"human-supervised autonomous system." Finally, Human Rights Watch calls a system that
can attack without any human interface a "human-out-of-the-loop weapon." The
Department of Defense moniker is "fully autonomous weapon system." LOSING
HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 2.
13 Lockheed Martin, Aegis Combat System,
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/aegis.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013);
Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Patriot TMD,
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/patriot.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2013)
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autonomous weapon system, Israel's Iron Dome, recently received a great
deal of attention as it very effectively destroyed incoming rockets from
Gaza.14 The only substantive distinction between these systems and those
that are fully autonomous is that a human with override capability carefully
monitors the operation of the human-supervised systems.
Other autonomous systems are sometimes labelled "automatic
weapons defense systems."'1 Such systems respond automatically (or near
automatically) when they detect incoming threats; their key distinguishing
features are that they are designed solely for defense and are fixed. An
example is the "close-in weapon system" (CIWS or "Sea Whiz").16 Used for
point-defense of warships against incoming missiles, the Sea Whiz can be
programmed to detect and automatically engage inbound missiles based on
parameters that include speed and altitude.
Weapon systems may also be "semi-autonomous." Their use is
commonplace in contemporary warfare.' 7 Semi-autonomous weapon
systems engage specific targets or categories of targets that a human
operator selects. For instance, a "fire and forget" missile on an aircraft locks
onto a target identified by the pilot and then attacks it without human
involvement.
The United States is not currently fielding any fully autonomous
weapon systems.'8 Nor are there any "plans to develop lethal autonomous
14 Iron Dome can operate automatically using programmed parameters, but the system also
allows for human operator intervention. Inbal Orpaz, How Does Iron Dome Operate?,
HAARETZ, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/how-does-the-iron-
dome-work.premium-1.478988; Iron Dome, RAFAEL,
http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIPSTORAGE/FILES/6/946.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2013).
15 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 9.
16MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), U.S. NAVY (October 19, 2012)
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact-display.asp?cid= 2100&tid= 487&ct= 2.
17 The weapons are also known as "launch and leave" weapons. Examples include the
AGM- 130 and AGM-65 missiles used for attacking ground targets. For descriptions of
these and other such systems, see Factsheets (Weapons), U.S. AIR FORCE,
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/index.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
18 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09: AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:
RESPONSE-TO-QUERY TALKING POINTS 1 (date unknown) (on file with author). The
United States fields autonomous weapon systems that use nonlethal and non-kinetic force.
An example is the Miniature Air Launched DecoyJammer (MALD-J), which is launched
from an aircraft and flies a preprogrammed mission while jamming enemy radar and
serving as a decoy. Id. at 2.
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weapon systems other than human-supervised systems for the purposes of
local defense of manned vehicles or installations."' 9 This does "not preclude
a change in that policy as the capacity for autonomy evolves." 20 In fact, such
a change can be expected. A series of DoD studies, plans, and roadmaps
have thoroughly discussed autonomous weapons technology, clearly in
anticipation of its possible fielding in the future. 2' A U.S. Joint Forces
Command study has likewise acknowledged that, based upon "the explosive
developments in technology," it can "envision a world in which humans
need not be in the decision loop."22
Operational realities will likely drive the United States to discard its
practice of keeping a human in the loop for lethal targeting decisions. First,
requiring a human in the loop can be personnel intensive. For example, it
can take scores of people, from pilots and weapon systems operators to
technicians and intelligence analysts, to operate a single tethered unmanned
aircraft.23 As a rule, the more autonomous the system, the fewer personnel
needed to operate it.
19 Id. at 3. The U.K. Ministry of Defence similarly has no current plans to develop fully
autonomous weapon systems. Meredith Hagger & Tim McCormack, Regulating the Use of
Unmanned Combat Vehicles: Are General Principles ofInternational Humanitarian Law Sufficient?, 2 1
J.L. INFO. & SCI. 74, 89 (2011).
20 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 8.
21 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS ROADMAP
2007-2032 49, 54 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/usroadmap2007.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF.,, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS ROADMAP 2005-2030
52 (2005), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav-roadmap2005.pdf;
U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047 50-51 (2009),
available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/072309kpl.pdf [hereinafter USAF FLIGHT
PLAN].22 U.SJOINT FORCES COMMAND, UNMANNED EFFECTS (UFX): TAKING THE HUMAN
OUT OF THE Loop, PROJECT ALPHA STUDY, RAPID ASSESSMENT PROCESS (RAP)
REPORT #03-10 4 (2003), available at http://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/org/JFC/RAPno.03-
10.pdf [hereinafter PROJECT ALPHA STUDY]. See also USAF FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at
41 (2009) (contending that "advances in [artificial intelligence] will enable systems to make
combat decisions and act within legal and policy constraints without necessarily requiring
human input. Authorizing a machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent upon
political and military leaders resolving legal and ethical questions.").
23 Some sources estimate that it takes at least fifty-five personnel to operate a Predator.
DEFENSE UPDATE, RQ -1A/MQ- 1 Predator UA V, http:/ /defense-
update.com/products/p/predator.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2013)
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Second, unmanned systems tethered to a human operator are
vulnerable to satellite communications jamming and cyber-attack; they
cannot operate once the communications link with the operator has been
severed. 24 Both disruptive capabilities are rapidly improving.2 5 Third, a
tethered system might prove unacceptably slow. Many nations, including
China, are already developing advanced systems with autonomous
features.26 Future combat may therefore occur at such a high tempo that
human operators will simply be unable to keep up.27 Indeed, advanced
weapon systems may well "create an environment too complex for humans
to direct."28 A force that does not employ fully autonomous weapon systems
will inevitably operate outside its enemy's "OODA loop," thereby ceding
initiative on the battlefield. 29 Facing such realities, some DoD studies have
24 SeeJAN VAN TOL ET AL., AIRSEA BATTLE: A POINT-OF-DEPARTURE OPERATIONAL
CONCEPT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 33-34 (2010),
available at http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/2010.05.18-AirSea-
Battle.pdf.
25 ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS 38-39 (2009). Jamming and cyber-attacks may also disrupt or manipulate
communications between an unmanned system and GPS navigation satellites. To ensure
reliability both as to location and target, therefore, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should
also be equipped with inertial navigation systems.
26 Darren Stewart, New Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict. Technological Meteorites and Legal
Dinosaurs?, 87 NAVAL WAR C. INT'L L. STUD. 272, 276-77, 281 (2011), available at
https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a276a9eb-38b1-47d4-93f'9-bd03ca86a5c6/New-
Technology-and-the-Law-of-Armed-Conflict.aspx. For example, South Korea has begun
development of fully autonomous lethal unmanned ground systems to patrol the
demilitarized zone. RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN
AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 10 (2009). The Israelis have similarly developed and deployed an
autonomous unmanned ground vehicle to patrol its borders. Brendan Gogarty & Meredith
Hagger, The Laws ofMan over Vehicles Unmnanned: The Legal Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea,
Land and Air, 19J. L. INFO. & SCI. 73, 90-91 (2008). Perhaps even more disconcerting is the
ease with which terrorist or other dangerous organizations might obtain such technology.
For example, Hezbollah reportedly used makeshift armed UAVs against Israel in 2006.
ARKIN, supra note 26, at 44.
27 "[A]rmed robots are set to change the pace of battle dramatically in the coming decade.
It may not be militarily advantageous to keep a human in control of targeting." Noel
Sharkey, Drones Proliferation and Protection of Civilians, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGIES 108, 110 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg ed.,
2012), available at
http://www.iihl.org/iihl/documents/IHL%/o20and%/o20new%/o20weapon%/o20technologies
Sanremo%20(2).pdf. See also Stewart, supra note 26, at 275.
28 P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 128 (2009) (quoting Thomas Adams, Colonel (Ret.),
U.S. Army).
29 The "OODA loop" refers to the "Observe, Orient, Decide, Act" cycle. The key to the
concept is completing the cycle faster than the enemy such that the enemy is always in a
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recommended "aggressively" incorporating autonomy into future systems.30
They have even suggested that autonomous weapons may become the norm
on the battlefield in a generation. 3'
A host of autonomous features are presently the subject of research
and development efforts. For instance, the U.S. Navy has successfully begun
testing its X-47B aircraft, which is designed to take off and land
autonomously on an aircraft carrier.32 The U.S. Army and Marines have
developed a version of the so-called K-Max helicopters capable of flying
autonomously along a directed route. The helicopters have already flown
autonomously in Afghanistan to deliver cargo between forward operating
bases.33 The British military is designing a supersonic attack aircraft, known
as the Taranis, which will fly autonomously but not engage targets without
human operator approval. 34 While these systems are not yet designed to
autonomously attack an enemy, it is not difficult to imagine how such
technology could be adjusted to support fully autonomous targeting.
The computing capabilities of future autonomous weapon systems
will be exponentially faster and more powerful than those of contemporary
military systems and the computers they employ will be physically much
smaller. Autonomous systems will also be equipped with advanced general
(or strong) artificial intelligence applications. Instead of merely making
choices in order to complete specific and defined tasks, general artificial
intelligence systems will exhibit human-like cognitive abilities, enabling
them to make decisions in response to complex problems and situations.3 1
reactive mode and cannot seize the initiative. "[By] 2047 technology will be able to reduce
the time to complete the OODA loop to micro or nanoseconds." USAF FLIGHT PLAN,
supra note 21, at 16.
30 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. SCIENCE BD., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN
DOD SYSTEMS 1 (July 2012) [hereinafter DSB REPORT], available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf.
31 PROJECT ALPHA STUDY, supra note 22, at 4. See also SINGER, supra note 28, at 128.
32 Jonathan Skilings, Unmanned X-47B Aircraft Completes Sea Trial, CNET (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-57560226-76/unmanned-x-47b-aircraft-completes-
sea-trial/.
33 Autonomous Helicopters: Robocopter Arrives, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 15, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21562897.
34 Ryan Gallagher, Militay Moves Closer to Truly Autonomous Drones, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/20 13/01 / 16/taranis neuron militaries movin
g closer to truly autonmoous drones.html.
SS Human-like cognitive abilities are not the equivalent of human abilities. No consensus
exists as to if and when general artificial intelligence shall be available. Noel Sharkey, for
239
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The systems will adapt and learn by observing their environment and their
interaction with it.36 In fact, the President of the International Committee
for the Red Cross (ICRC) has posed the prospect of an autonomous system
that might "be programmed to behave more ethically and far more
cautiously on the battlefield than a human being."37
It is clearly a mistake to assume that autonomous weapons systems
will resemble contemporary remotely piloted systems. To the contrary,
some will represent a radical departure in form and possess almost
unimaginable increases in capability. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA), for instance, is designing an anti-submarine
warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel (ACTUV) able to stay at sea
autonomously for up to 90 days while it finds, tracks, and attacks enemy
submarines.38 And some autonomous attacks will be mounted by large
numbers of small, expendable systems that engage enemy targets
collaboratively as part of a swarm. Swarm technology holds tremendous
potential for rapidly attacking and overwhelming an enemy.39
example, doubts that advances in artificial intelligence will achieve human-like abilities in
the next fifteen years. Noel Sharkey, Automating Warfare: Lessons Learnedfrom the Drones, 21 J.L.
INFO. & SCI. 140 (2011).
36 SINGER, supra note 28, at 74; Jacob Kellenberger, International Humanitarian Law and New
Weapon Technologies, Keynote Address at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues of
International Humanitarian Law in San Remo, September 8, 2011, at 5,
http://iihl.org/iihl/Documents/JKBSan%/o20Remo%/o20Speech.pdf.
37 Kellenberger, supra note 36, at 5.
38 DARPA's Anti Submarine Warfare Game Goes Live, DARPA, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/2011/04/04 DARPA's Anti-
SubmarineWarfare-game-goeslive.aspx; Spencer Ackerman, Here's How Darpa's Robot
Ship Will Hunt Silent Subs, WIRED, Dec. 27, 2012,
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/12/actuv/. Note, however, that, at least
initially, the ship is designed to require human operator approval before launching an
attack. Similar underwater systems may conduct de-mining operations. Examples include
the Underwater Influence Sweep System and the Knifefish, currently being developed by
the U.S. Navy. See Spencer Ackerman, Navy Preps to Build a Robot Ship That Blows Up Mines,
WIRED,Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/01/robot-mine-
sweeper/.
39 "As autonomy and automation merge, [systems] will be able to swarm ... creating a
focused, relentless, and scaled attack." USAF FLIGHT PLAN, supra note 21, at 16. See also
WJ. Henigan, Boeing Technology Enables Drones To Swarm Like Insects, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-08-09/business/chi-boeing-technology-
allows-drones-to-swarm-like-insects-20120809_1_drones-swarm-scaneagle. The U.S. Air
Force's Proliferated Autonomous Weapons (PRAWNs) may represent an early prototype of
future swarming systems. SINGER, supra note 28, at 232-33. See also Philip Alston, Lethal
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Before turning to the legal issues surrounding autonomous weapon
systems, it is necessary to debunk a number of myths about autonomous
weapon systems that are clouding public debate. First, the idea of "robot
wars" is pure science fiction. As noted by a Department of Defense Task
Force, "the true value of these systems is not to provide a direct human
replacement, but rather to extend and complement human capability by
providing potentially unlimited persistent capabilities, reducing human
exposure to life threatening tasks, and, with proper design, reducing the
high cognitive load currently placed on operators/supervisors." 40
Autonomous weapon systems will be integrated into human warfare, but are
highly unlikely to replace it.41
Second, neither the United States nor any other country is
contemplating the development of any systems that would simply hunt
down and kill or destroy enemy personnel and objects without restrictive
engagement parameters, such as limiting the area of operation or nature of
the target. As the Defense Science Board points out, "all autonomous
systems are supervised by human operators at some level, and autonomous
systems' software embodies the designed limits on the actions and decisions
delegated to the computer. Instead of viewing autonomy as an intrinsic
property of an unmanned vehicle in isolation, the design and operation of
autonomous systems needs to be considered in terms of human-system
collaboration."42 At least for the foreseeable future, autonomous weapon
systems will only attack targets meeting predetermined criteria and will
function within an area of operations set by human operators.
The U.S. Department of Defense is exceptionally sensitive to the
human interface issue. It has recently promulgated policy guidance that
Robotic Technologies: The Implications for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 21 J.L.
INFO. & SCI. 35, 43 (2011).
40 DSB REPORT, supra note 30.
41 As one commentator has perceptively noted, "Just as a knife extends the reach and
lethality of a hand, sophisticated weapons like [autonomous weapon systems] can be
considered extensions of human action, and the primary difference is the increase in time
and distance intervening between the action and result." Vik Kanwar, Post-Human
Humanitarian Law: the Law of War in the Age of Robotic Weapons, 2 HARV. NAT'L SEC.J. 616,
619-620 (2011).
42 DSB REPORT, supra note 30, at 1-2. DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 12, T 4a,
similarly provides that "[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be
designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human
judgment over the use of force."
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requires the Secretaries of the military departments, the Commander of
U.S. Special Operations Command, and certain other high-level officials to:
[d]esign human-machine interfaces for autonomous and
semi-autonomous weapon systems to be readily
understandable to trained operators, provide traceable
feedback on system status, and provide clear procedures for
trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions .
. . ; [c]ertify that operators of autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems have been trained in system
capabilities, doctrine, and [tactics, techniques, and
procedures] in order to exercise appropriate levels of human
judgment in the use of force and employ systems with
appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war,
applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and
applicable [rules of engagement] . . . ; [and e]stablish and
periodically review training, and [tactics, techniques, and
procedures], and doctrine for autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems to ensure operators and
commanders understand the functioning, capabilities, and
limitations of a system's autonomy in realistic operational
conditions, including as a result of possible adversary
actions.43
Finally, robots will not "go rogue." While autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems will be susceptible to malfunction, that is also
the case with weapon systems ranging from catapults to computer attack
systems. Like a missile that "goes ballistic" (loses guidance), future
autonomous systems could fall out of parameters. However, the prospect of
them "taking on a life of their own" is a fantastical Hollywood invention. 44
The one real risk is tampering by the enemy or non-State actors
such as hackers. As an example, the enemy might be able to use cyber
means to take control of an autonomous weapon system and direct it against
friendly forces or a civilian population. Those developing the systems are
acutely aware of such risk. U.S. policy on the matter is that, "[c]onsistent
with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of
43 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 12, encl. 4, T 8.
44 Interview with Alan Schultz, U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Laboratory for
Autonomous Systems Research, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 25, 2012).
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control of the system to unauthorized parties, physical hardware and
software will be designed with appropriate: (a) [s]afeties, anti-tamper
mechanisms, and information assurance [and]; (b) [h]uman machine
interface." 45 It should be noted that because the risk of tampering is not
limited to autonomous weapon systems, it represents an especially
significant vulnerability for advanced militaries. 46
III. The Law Applicable to Autonomous Weapon Systems
There is universal consensus that the law of armed conflict applies to
autonomous weapon systems. 47 Indeed, the legal requirement to conduct a
review of new weaponry, discussed below, would be absurd were this not
the case. What is contentious is how particular norms apply to new systems,
such as drones, cyber weapons, and autonomous weapon systems. 48
In Losing Humanity, Human Rights Watch concludes that " [a] n initial
evaluation of fully autonomous weapons shows . . . such robots would
appear to be incapable of abiding by key principles of international
humanitarian law. They would be unable to follow the rules of distinction,
proportionality, and military necessity and might contravene the Martens
Clause." 49
Such conclusions mistakenly conflate two distinct strains of weapons
law. One focuses on the legality of the weapon system itself. To illustrate,
under customary international law, biological weapons are unlawful per se;
this is so even if they are used against lawful targets, such as the enemy's
armed forces. Legal reviews of new weaponry are intended to identify those
systems running afoul of the law on this basis. A separate family of
prohibitions (labelled "conduct of hostilities" rules) bears on the use of
weapon systems, not their legality as such. To take a simple example, a rifle
is lawful, but may be used unlawfully, as in shooting a civilian or a prisoner
of war. Since a weapon must successfully navigate both tracks before it may
45 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 12, encl. 4, T 4a(2).
46 As an example, cyber means may be used to take control of tethered unmanned systems.
Cyber means may even be used to manipulate data that conventional weapons use to
geolocate targets.
47 "There can be no doubt that IHL applies to new weaponry and to the employment in
warfare of new technological developments." ICRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 36.
48 For an example, see the analysis of the applicability of various law of armed conflict
norms to cyber operations in the TALLINN M\/ANUAL, supra note 9, part II.
49 LOSING HUMANITY, sup ra note 1, at 30.
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be lawfully used on a battlefield, it is essential to understand the difference
before painting a system unlawful with broad strokes.
A. Weapons Unlawful Per Se
Among the earliest prohibitions with respect to the legality of
weapons per se is the ban on means or methods of warfare that are of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 0 It first
appeared in the regulations annexed to the 1899 Hague Convention II and
its 1907 counterpart.? Article 35(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the
1949 Geneva Conventions affirms the prohibition: "It is prohibited to
employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."52
Substantively, the article outlaws those means and methods of warfare that
unnecessarily aggravate suffering or injury, that is, which cause suffering or
injury serving no military purpose. Article 35(2) applies only to harm
experienced by combatants; other provisions of the law of armed conflict
protect civilians? 3 The article irrefutably reflects customary international
law and, therefore, the norm binds even States that are not Party to the
50 See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 63-67 (2d ed., 2010); WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY,
WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, ch. 5 (2009).
51 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, pmblJuly 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Hague II]; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague
IV]. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration presaged the prohibition with its condemnation
of "the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable." Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, pmbl, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18
Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474.
52 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 35(2).
53 For the purposes of this Article, the term "combatants" includes civilians who are directly
participating in hostilities since they are subject to attack for such time as they so
participate. Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(3). On the subject of targetability
and direct participation, which is of particular importance in the context of autonomous
weapon systems, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Nils Melzer ed., 2009), available at,
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE]; Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Particiation in
Hostilities.: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC.J. 5 (2010), available at
http://harvardnsj.org/201 0/05/the-interpretive-guidance-on-the-notion-of-direct-
participation-in-hostilities-a-critical-analysis!.
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Protocol, such as the United States. 4
Autonomous systems would not automatically violate the prohibition
on unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury because Article 35(2) only
addresses a weapon system's effect on the targeted individual, not the
manner of engagement (autonomous). Nevertheless, an autonomous system
could be used as a platform for a weapon that would violate the prohibition,
such as a bomb containing fragments that are designed to be difficult to
locate during the treatment of wounded combatants.5" The combination of
the platform and the weapon would render the autonomous weapon system
unlawful per se. But this possibility is not a valid basis for imposing an across-
the-board pre-emptive ban on the systems.
The law of armed conflict also prohibits weapon systems that cannot
be aimed.56 These weapons are unlawful per se in that they are of a nature to
strike combatants, military objectives, civilians, and civilian objects without
distinction. A norm of customary international law,57 the companion treaty
prohibition appears in Article 51(4)(b) of Additional Protocol I:
"Indiscriminate attacks are ... [t] hose which employ a method or means of
combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective."5 8
54 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 70;
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.CJ. 226 (July
8), 78. [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. See also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(xx);
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 9.1.1. On Article 35(2), see INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987) , 1410-1439 [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY]; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARLJOSEF
PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A. SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS:
COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 195-198 (1982).
55 Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects) on Non-detectable Fragments, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168;
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 79.
56 See generally BOOTHBY, supra note 50, ch. 6.
57 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rules 7, 12.
See also Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note
9, 5.3.2, 9.1.2. Application of the prohibition evolves over time in relation to the
development of increasingly accurate weapon systems. To illustrate, many of the gravity
bombs designed for release from high altitudes that were dropped during World War II
would today be characterized as indiscriminate.SB AP COMMENTARY, suprTa note 54, 1956-1960.
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The ban on weapon systems that are indiscriminate because they
cannot be aimed at a lawful target is often confused with the prohibition on
the use of discriminate weapons in an indiscriminate manner. The classic
case is that of the SCUD missiles launched by Iraq during the 1990-91 Gulf
War. While it is true that the missiles were inaccurate, they were not
unlawful per se because situations existed in which they could be employed
discriminately. In particular, the missiles were capable of employment
against troops in open areas such as the desert, and they actually struck very
large military installations without seriously endangering the civilian
population.59 However, when launched in the direction of cities, as
repeatedly occurred during the conflict, their use was undeniably unlawful.
Even though the cities contained military objectives, the missiles were
insufficiently accurate to reliably strike any of them.
Critics of autonomous weapons claim that " [fully autonomous
weapons would not have the ability to sense or interpret the difference
between soldiers and civilians, especially in contemporary combat
environments." 60 But, as with the SCUD, an assertion that a weapon system
is unlawful can only pass muster if there are no circumstances in which it
can be used without placing civilians at excessive risk. What has been missed
in much of the dialogue so far is that even an autonomous weapon system
that is completely incapable of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant or
a military objective from a civilian object can be used lawfully in certain
environments. Not all battlespaces contain civilians or civilian objects.
When they do not, a system devoid of an ability to distinguish protected
persons and objects from lawful military targets can be used without
endangering the former. Typical examples would include the employment
of such systems for an attack on a tank formation in a remote area of the
desert or from warships in areas of the high seas far from maritime
navigation routes. The inability of the weapon systems to distinguish bears
on the legality of their use in particular circumstances (such as along a
roadway on which military and civilian traffic travels), but not on their
lawfulness per se.
59 See RAND CORPORATION, Coalition SCUD-Hunting in Iraq, 1991, in SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES AND ELUSIVE ENEMY GROUND TARGETS (2001), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph reports/MR1408/MR1408.
ch3.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 166-168 (1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf.
60 LOSING HUMANITY, sup ra note 1, at 30.
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The claims of the critics are not only counter-normative, they are
counter-factual. Military technology has advanced well beyond simply being
able to spot an individual or object. Modern sensors can, inter alia, assess the
shape and size of objects, determine their speed, identify the type of
propulsion being used, determine the material of which they are made,
listen to the object and its environs, and intercept associated
communications or other electronic emissions. They can also collect
additional data on other objects or individuals in the area and, depending
on the platform with which they are affiliated, monitor a potential target for
extended periods in order to gather information that will enhance the
reliability of identification and facilitate target engagement when the risk of
collateral damage is low. Even software for autonomous weapon systems
that enables visual identification of individuals, thereby enhancing accuracy
during autonomous "personality strikes" against specified persons, is likely
to be developed.61 These and related technological capabilities auger against
characterization of autonomous weapon systems as unlawful per se solely
based on their autonomous nature. 62
It must be emphasized that as a matter of law, more may not be
asked of autonomous weapon systems than of human-operated systems. For
example, some opponents of autonomous weapons contend a ban is
necessary because autonomous weapon systems may be deceived, as in the
case of "concealing weapons or by exploiting their sensual and behavioural
limitations," and thereby have difficulty distinguishing civilians from
combatants. 63 Yet, asymmetrically disadvantaged enemies have been
feigning civilian or other protected status to avoid being engaged by human-
operated weapon systems for centuries. 64 The fact that the techniques
sometimes prove successful has never merited classifying those systems as
61 Some opponents of autonomous weapons have a more pessimistic view of the capabilities
autonomous weapons possess: "Current sensing apparatus and processing can just about
tell us that something resembles a human, but little else." Sharkey, Automating Warfare, supra
note 35, at 143-44. See also Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance ofAutonomous
Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 284-85 (2011).
62 In particular, these capabilities reveal that Human Rights Watch's concerns that
combatants sometimes fail to "wear uniforms or insignia" or are identifiable only through
their "direct participation in hostilities" are exaggerated (at least with regard to the issue of
distinction by the systems). See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 30.
63 Id. at 3 1.
64 See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 A.F. L.
REV. 1 (2008). The critics might also have cited the use of human shields, a practice that
would also complicate autonomous weapon system targeting. See Michael N. Schmitt,
Human Shields and International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 292 (2009).
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indiscriminate per se. In fact, it would be counter-productive to take such an
approach because it would incentivize the enemy's use of the tactic in order
to keep weapon systems off the battlefield.
Some critics have also decried the inability of autonomous weapon
systems to recognize human intentions. 65 Although improved gesture and
intent recognition software for autonomous systems development is
underway, the technology remains in its infancy.66 Yet, while it may be true
that human perception of human activity can sometimes enhance
identification, human-operated systems already engage targets without the
benefit of emotional sensitivity. For example, human-operated "beyond
visual range" attacks are commonplace in modern warfare; no serious
charge has been levelled that the weapon systems conducting them are
unlawful per se. 67
In fact, human judgment can prove less reliable than technical
indicators in the heat of battle. For instance, during the 1994 friendly fire
shootdown of two U.S. Army Blackhawks in the no-fly zone over northern
Iraq, the U.S. Air Force F-15s involved made a close visual pass of the
targets before engaging them.68 Pilot error (and human error aboard the
AWACs monitoring the situation) contributed to their misidentification as
Iraqi military helicopters. Similarly, in 1988 the USS Vincennes engaged an
Iranian airliner that it mistakenly believed was conducting an attack on the
ship. The warship's computers accurately indicated that the aircraft was
ascending. Nevertheless, human error led the crew to believe it was
descending in an attack profile and, in order to defend the ship, they shot
65 For example, Human Rights Watch contends "fully autonomous weapons would not
possess human qualities necessary to assess an individual's intentions." LOSING HUMANITY,
supra note 1, at 31.
66 Some autonomous systems, such as those being developed and tested at the U.S. Naval
Research Laboratory's new Laboratory for Autonomous System Research, are having
initial success in understanding basic human speech, expression, and hand gestures. Jessica
L. Tozer, Robots With Faces, ARMED WITH SCIENCE (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://science.dodlive.mil/2012/04/05/robots-with-faces/.
67 As an example, the U.S. Navy's AIM-54 air-to-air Phoenix missile has a range in excess
of 100 nautical miles. AIM-54 Phoenix Missile, U.S. NAVY,
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact-display.asp?cid= 2200&tid= 700&ct= 2 (last visited
Feb. 23, 2013).
68 U.S. ARMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT, U.S. ARMY UH-60
BLACKHAWK HELICOPTERS 87-26000 AND 88-26060 Vol.1 (Executive Summary) (May 27,
1994), at 3, available at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation and plans/PersianGulfWar/973- 1.pdf.
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down the aircraft.69 Such tragedies demonstrate that a human in the loop is
not a panacea during situations in which it may be difficult to distinguish
civilians and civilian objects from combatants and military objectives.
Critics of autonomous weapon systems sometimes note the unique
emotional character of human beings to suggest that "robots would not be
restrained by human emotions and the capacity for compassion, which can
provide an important check on the killing of civilians." 70 The Losing Humanity
report even concludes that " [e] motionless robots could, therefore, serve as
tools of repressive dictators seeking to crack down on their own people
without fear the troops would turn on them." 7' Although emotions can
restrain humansit is equally true that they can unleash the basest of
instincts. From Rwanda and the Balkans to Darfur and Afghanistan, history
is replete with tragic examples of unchecked emotions leading to horrendous
suffering. The International Committee of the Red Cross made precisely
this point in a 2011 report on the challenges of contemporary armed
conflicts: "After all, emotion, the loss of colleagues and personal self-interest
is not an issue for a robot and the record of respect for [the law of armed
conflict] by human soldiers is far from perfect, to say the least." 72 An
autonomous weapon system's lack of emotions serves as little justification for
an outright ban.
An autonomous weapon system only violates the prohibition against
weapons incapable of being directed at a lawful target if there are no
circumstances, given its intended use, in which it can be used discriminately.
Consider an autonomous anti-personnel weapon system designed for
employment in urban areas. Because it is contemplated for use where
civilians and combatants are regularly co-located, the system must have
sufficient sensor and artificial intelligence capability to distinguish them;
otherwise, it qualifies as indiscriminate per se. By contrast, an autonomous
69 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES
SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655 ON 3JULY 1988 37,42-45 (Aug.
19, 1988), available at
http:/ /www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/International security-affairs/other/ 17 2.pdf. The report
concluded that " [s]tress, task fixation, and unconscious distortion of data may have played
a major role in this incident." Id. at 145. It also noted that "scenario fulfillment," that is, the
distortion of "dataflow in an unconscious attempt to make available evidence fit a
preconceived scenario." Id.
70 LOSING HUMANITY suptra note 1, at 4
711Id. at 4.
72 ICRC REPORT, suprTa note 10, at 40.
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weapon system unable to reliably distinguish between civilians and
combatants, but planned for use where civilians are not present, would not
be unlawful per se. However, it would still have to be capable of geographical
restriction (either based on system constraints such as maximum range and
endurance or on human operator pre-programming) to prevent it from
passing into areas where civilians are located. Arguably, autonomous
weapon systems must also be capable of temporal limitation since few areas
are always completely devoid of civilians or civilian objects.73
A second form of prohibition on indiscriminate weapons is codified
in Article 51(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I, and reflects customary
international law.74 It disallows weapon systems that, despite being able to
strike their targets accurately, have uncontrollable effects. The paradigmatic
example is a biological contagion used to infect combatants, the subsequent
spread of which is uncontrollable.7 A biological weapon could not lawfully
be mounted on an autonomous platform. Another example is an
autonomous weapon that searches for and conducts cyber attacks against
dual-use infrastructure (cyber infrastructure used by both the military and
civilians). The malware used to conduct the attacks could be indiscriminate
if designed in a way that makes it likely to spread into the civilian network.76
In such a case, the autonomous weapon would be unlawful per se.
B. Unlawful Use of Weapons
The likelihood of an autonomous weapon system being unlawful per
se is very low. However, as noted perceptively by the ICRC in a report
73 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 12, T 4a(1)(b), requires measures to be taken to
ensure that autonomous weapon systems " [c]omplete engagements in a timeframe
consistent with commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, terminate
engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the engagement."
74 "Indiscriminate attacks are ... [t]hose which employ a method or means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol." Additional Protocol I, supra
note 8, art. 51(4)(c). See also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY,
supra note 9, Rules 12, 71; Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(xx); COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 5.3.2.
75 Of course, biological weapons have been rendered unlawful as such, irrespective of
Article 51(4)(c), in treaty law. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163; CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 73.
76 Injury or physical damage would have to result in the case of the cyber attack. TALLINN
MANUAL, supra note 9, Rule 43 and accompanying commentary.
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addressing, inter alia, autonomous weapons, "the crucial question does not
seem to be whether new technologies are good or bad in themselves, but
instead what are the circumstances of their use." 77 In other words, the law of
armed conflict rules that govern the use of weapons are more relevant to the
issue of autonomous weapon systems than those rules that limit the nature
of weaponry. Any such examination of the use of weapons should naturally
begin with the seminal principle of distinction.
1. Distinction
Distinction is one of two principles in the law of armed conflict
recognized as "cardinal" by the International Court of Justice, which has
also characterized it as "intransgressible." 78 The principle of distinction
serves as the fount for the law of armed conflict rules, including those
regarding the use of weapon systems that seek to safeguard civilians, civilian
objects, and other protected persons and places during the conduct of
hostilities. Article 48 of Additional Protocol I codifies this customary law
principle: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between
civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives." 79 The principle incontrovertibly
applies to autonomous weapon systems. 80
Distinction is operationalized in a number of rules, the two most
fundamental being the customary law prohibitions on making civilians8'
and civilian objects82 the target of attacks. They are codified, respectively, in
Articles 51(2) and 52(1) of Additional Protocol I:
77 ICRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 40.
78 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, 78-79.
79 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 48, at 25. See also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 1 (explaining its customary law nature).
80 A distinguished group of law of armed conflict experts examining the international law
applicable to air and missile warfare specifically affirmed that the principle of distinction
applied to autonomous weapon systems: "[An autonomous weapons system's] sensors and
computer programs must be able to distinguish between military objectives and civilian
objects, as well as between civilians and combatants." AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY,
supra note 9, Rule 17a, 3.
81 See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN Law, supra note 9, Rules 1, 6; Rome
Statute, supra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(i); COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, suptra note 9, 1 8.3.
82 See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, sup ra note 9, Rules 7, 9, 10;
Rome Statute, sup ra note 9, art. 8(2)(b)(ii); COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, sup ra note 9, 8.3.
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Article 51(2): The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian
population are prohibited.83
Article 52(1): Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of
reprisals. 84
Obviously, it would be unlawful to use an autonomous weapon system to
directly attack civilians or civilian objects or to intentionally terrorize the
civilian population. In this regard, note that the same issues that present
themselves with regard to other weapons systems also appear in the case of
autonomous weapon systems. For instance, the exception to the prohibition
on attacking civilians that exists for those who directly participate in
hostilities also applies to the use of autonomous weapon systems against
them.8 5 Similarly, the universally accepted definition of military objectives
found in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I, pertains equally to attacks by
autonomous weapon systems on objects,86 as does the controversy over
whether war-sustaining objects qualify as military objectives.87 As these
issues are common to all weapon systems, they will not be addressed here.88
83 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(2), at 26. See also AP COMMENTARY, supra note
54, 1938-41; BOTHE, supra note 54, at 300-01.
84 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 52(1), at 27. See also AP COMMENTARY, supra note
54, 2011-13; BOTHE supra note 54, at 322-23.
85 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 51(3), at 26; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 6; INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note
53.
86 "in so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which
by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military of advantage." Additional Protocol I, supra note
8, art. 52(2), at 27.
87 Although the United States accepts the definition of military objectives set forth in Article
52(2) as an accurate articulation of the customary law norm, its explanation of the concept
in the Commander's Handbook extends the definition to objects that sustain the war effort,
such as oil exports. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 8.2, 8.2.5. See also
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, commentary accompanying Rule 38 (discussing the
controversy); Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting in Operational Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 245, 254 (Terry D. Gill & Dieter Fleck
eds., 2010) (same).
88 For application to another contemporary category of weapons, see TALLINN MANUAL,
supra note 9, chs. 4-5 and accompanying commentary.
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Article 51(4)(a), which reflects customary international law, sets forth
a further prohibition that is particularly relevant to autonomous systems. By
the article, attacks that are not directed at a specific target, and, as a result,
are of a nature to strike lawful targets and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction, are banned. 89 Unlike the ban on indiscriminate
weapons, this prohibition involves a weapon that is capable of being aimed
at a lawful target, but the attacker does not do so. 90 As an example, it would
clearly be unlawful to employ a programmable autonomous weapon system
capable of distinguishing military from civilian aircraft without activating
the relevant sensors in an environment where civilian aircraft might be
present. Reduced to basics, the prohibition on indiscriminate use of a
weapon capable of discrimination requires the use of any sensors associated
with an autonomous weapon system capable of enhancing the ability to
distinguish in a situation where civilians may be present. Of course, use of
the sensors would not alone render the attack lawful. Even a discriminate
attack will be unlawful if it is in violation of the rule of proportionality or the
requirement to take precautions in attack.
2. Proportionality
An important element of the principle of distinction is the rule of
proportionality. This customary law rule, codified in Articles 51(5)(b) and
57(2)(a)(iii) of Additional Protocol I, prohibits "an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 91 It is
among the most complex and misunderstood norms in the law of armed
conflict with respect to both interpretation and application. 92 While the
89 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rules 11-12.
See also COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 5.3.2. On Article 51(4)(a), see AP
COMMENTARY, supra note 54, 1951-1955.
90 As noted by Yoram Dinstein, " [t]he key to finding that a certain attack has been
indiscriminate is the nonchalant state of mind of the attacker." DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at
127.
91 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 51(5)(b) & 57(2)(a)(iii), at 26, 29. As to its
customary nature, see CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 14;
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 5.3.3.
92 To take one common example, the collateral damage caused during an attack, or the
failure to achieve an attack's military aim, are often considered when characterizing a
particular attack as violating the rule. Such an approach is counter-normative because the
rule of proportionality is evaluated ex ante, not post factum. For instance, if an attacker
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discussion that follows is limited to those aspects of proportionality having
particular relevance to the issue of autonomy, it must be cautioned that
other issues - such as whether the survival of the weapon system conducting
the attack qualifies as "military advantage" - that have plagued application
of the rule in other contexts are no less applicable with respect to
autonomous weapon systems. 93
At the core of the rule of proportionality lies the notion of
"excessiveness." The law of armed conflict contains no accepted definition
of the term excessive. However, excessiveness "is not a matter of counting
civilian casualties and comparing them to the number of enemy combatants
that have been put out of action." 94 Rather, it is the product of a case-by-
case assessment that is evaluated in terms of its reasonableness given the
attendant circumstances. All that can be said of excessiveness in terms of
quantification is that the greater the reasonably anticipated military
advantage likely to accrue from an attack, the more the law of armed
conflict will tolerate the expected collateral damage.
This begs the question of whether autonomous weapon systems are
capable of performing proportionality calculations. Such calculations
require consideration of both expected collateral damage and anticipated
military advantage. An effective system already exists for determining the
likelihood of collateral damage to objects or persons near a target. The
"collateral damage estimate methodology" (CDEM) is a procedure whereby
an attacking force considers such factors as the precision of a weapon, its
blast effect, attack tactics, the probability of civilian presence in structures
reasonably expects to cause five incidental deaths, but the strike unpredictably causes 15,
the proportionality rule was not violated so long as five is not excessive in light of the
anticipated military advantage. On proportionality generally, see WilliamJ. Fenrick, The
Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91 (1982).
93 Although the authors disagree, some commentators suggest that the security of one's own
forces and "avoiding the placement of its military forces unnecessarily in harm's way" may
be part of the military advantage component of proportionality, at least with respect to the
proportionality provisions of Additional Protocol I, art. 57(2)(a)(iii). Jonathan David
Herbach, Into the Caves of Steel: Precaution, Cognition and Robotic Weapon Systems Under the
International Law ofArmed Conflict, 4(3) AMSTERDAM L. F. 3, 7-8 (2 012) , available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2154466. The use of autonomous systems may well be "the most
effective way of ensuring security of the attacking forces." Id. Including that factor in the
proportionality calculation could possibly lead to an increased use of autonomous weapons.
The authors take the more generally accepted position that force protection is an issue to be
considered in the context of precautions in attack, discussed below.
94 AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, Rule 14, 7.
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near the target, and the composition of structures to estimate the number of
civilian casualties likely to be caused during an attack.9 5 There is no
question that autonomous weapon systems could be programmed to
perform CDEM-like analyses to determine the likelihood of harm to
civilians in the target area since the analysis is performed using objective
data and scientific algorithms.
Yet, the analysis would not resolve whether a particular attack
complies with the rule of proportionality because it is necessary to consider
expected collateral damage in light of the military advantage anticipated to
result from the attack. Instead, CDEM is merely a policy-related instrument
used to determine the level of command at which an attack harming
civilians must be authorized; the greater the likelihood of such harm
according to the CDEM calculations, the higher the required approval
authority. A commander with authority to authorize the attack must still
make the proportionality determination as part of the attack's approval
process. It is this individual who evaluates, and factors in, the anticipated
military advantage. 96 In an attack that is not pre-planned, it is often the
individual conducting or controlling the attack, such as a pilot or a
supported ground force commander, who performs the proportionality
calculation by assessing risk to civilians and civilian objects and likely
military advantage.
The question is whether an autonomous weapon system would be
capable of gauging military advantage. Doing so will be challenging because
military advantage determinations are always contextual. For instance, an
attack on a command-and-control facility expected to cause five civilian
deaths at an early stage of the conflict yields greater military advantage than
an attack on the same facility that occurs after enemy forces are in disarray
95 For a discussion of the methodology, see Jeffrey Thurnher & Timothy Kelly, Panel
Discussion: Collateral Damage Estimation, YOUTUBE (Oct. 23, 2012).
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= AvdXJV-N56A&1ist= PLam-
yp5uUR1JYEwLbqCOIPrP4EhWOeTf8v&index= 1&feature=plpp-video. See also Defense
Intelligence Agency General Counsel, Briefing: Joint Targeting Cycle and Collateral Damage
Estimation Methodology (CDM) (Nov. 10, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/dronefoia/dod/drone-dodACLUDRONESJOINTSTAF
FSLIDES_1-47.pdf.
96 A word of caution is necessary. A commander's decision does not relieve others involved
in an attack of their own responsibility for compliance with international humanitarian law.
Even a commander's order must be disobeyed if it is manifestly unlawful. See, e.g., Rome
Statute, supra note 9, art. 33.
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and nearing defeat. Similarly, the destruction of a tank that is distant from
the frontlines does not yield as much military advantage as destruction of
one effectively firing on friendly forces. Because it is contextual, the military
advantage element of the proportionality rule generally necessitates case-by-
case determinations.
Although they have not yet been developed, "military advantage"
algorithms could theoretically be programmed into autonomous weapon
systems. For example, the systems could be pre-programmed with
unacceptable collateral damage thresholds for particular target sets or
situations. An autonomous weapon system could be programmed with a
base maximum collateral damage level of X for a tank; a human would
have to have already made the determination that X generally comports
with the proportionality rule. Although determining the appropriate
threshold would be a very subjective endeavour, as noted in the ICRC
commentary to Additional Protocol I, and as acknowledged in Losing
Humanity, proportionality determinations necessarily involve a "fairly broad
margin of judgment" and "must above all be a question of common sense
and good faith for military commanders." 97 Therefore, the "quantification"
of the military value of a target in terms of collateral damage does not
require surgical precision. Rather, the test is one of reasonableness.
Because military advantage is such a context specific value,
compliance with the rule of proportionality would require that the base
maximum collateral damage threshold either be very conservative or be
adjustable based on the engagement context. For instance, with regard to
the former, valuing an enemy tank at one civilian would generally be
reasonable during high order conflict. To the extent destruction of a tank
did not justify any civilian casualties in light of the intensity of the conflict at
a particular point in time, the commander would simply decide not to
employ the "non-adjustable" autonomous weapon system.
Being able to adjust values would provide much greater flexibility
since autonomous weapon systems could be programmed prior to launch
based on the current situation or even reprogrammed remotely while it is
hunting for targets should the situation change. As the technology advances,
algorithms that would permit the autonomous weapon system to itself adjust
the base level threshold to account for specified variables it encountered on
a mission will likely be developed. As an example, it would be reasonable to
97 AP COMMENTARY, suprTa note 54, 2208; LOSING HUMANITY, suprTa note 1, at 33.
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allow the system to increase the level of acceptable collateral damage if it
identifies a concentration of enemy tanks, as distinct from a single tank. The
concentration poses a greater threat, and, therefore, the military advantage
of destroying individual tanks making up the concentration is greater than
that of destroying the same tanks when they are operating alone. Similarly,
it would be reasonable for the system to adjust the level of acceptable
collateral damage based on whether a targeted tank is headed towards or
away from the battlefront.
Given the complexity and fluidity of the modern battlespace, it is
unlikely that, despite impressive advances in artificial intelligence,
"machines" will soon be programmable to perform robust assessments of a
strike's likely military advantage on their own. In part, this leads Human
Rights Watch to conclude that the proportionality test "requires more than
a balancing of quantitative data, and a robot could not be programmed to
duplicate the psychological processes in human judgment that are necessary
to assess proportionality." 98 But, again, it is inappropriate to ask more of
machines than the humans whom the law of proportionality was originally
designed to address. While autonomous weapon systems would likely not be
able to account for all imaginable scenarios and variables that might present
themselves during hostilities, the same is true of a human confronted with
unexpected or confusing events who must nonetheless make a time sensitive
decision in combat. Neither the human nor the machine is held to a
standard of perfection; in the law of armed conflict the standard is always
one of reasonableness.
For the immediate future, though, the actual proportionality
decision will continue to be made by humans-by deciding to launch the
system into a particular environment, by deciding on how to preprogram
the system, or by revising the engagement criteria remotely. These humans
remain fully responsible for compliance with the rule of proportionality.
They must determine whether the ensuing attacks are likely to cause
excessive collateral damage by considering both the system's capabilities
and the environment in which it will operate. For example, the operator will
have violated the rule if he or she approved use of an autonomous system
with weapons that were insufficiently precise to be used in a particular
setting, such as a city, and, as a result, harm to civilians and civilian objects
was reasonably likely to be excessive to the anticipated military gains.
98 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 33.
257
2013 / "Out of the Loop": Autonomous Weapon Systems and LOAC
3. Military Necessity
Critics sometimes rely on the principle of "military necessity" as a
basis for finding autonomous weapon systems unlawful. Human Rights
Watch cites the example of a system continuing to attack an individual who
is no longer fighting.99 In the authors' view, these assertions mischaracterize
military necessity as a distinct rule of the law of armed conflict, rather than a
foundational principle that undergirds the entire body of law.' 00 Moreover,
the very example cited by the organization has already sparked a virulent
debate in the context of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities.'0' In light of that controversy, it is hardly an
effective example to cite.
Even military necessity as understood by the critics would not render
autonomous weapon systems unlawful. They would not be unlawful per se
because there are clearly situations in which they are valuable militarily. In
other words, autonomous weapon systems are not superfluous, if for no
other reason than the fact that unlike manned systems they can attack the
enemy without placing an operator at risk. As to prohibitions based on use,
the requirement that military objectives yield some military advantage
would make any separate condition for military necessity redundant. 0 2
With regard to situations raising proportionality issues, any strike lacking
military advantage but causing harm to civilians or civilian objects would
violate the rule. 03 And as to situations such as those cited by Human Rights
Watch, the law of armed conflict already prohibits attacks on those who
99 Id. at 34-35. Military necessity was originally described in the "Lieber Code": "the
necessity of those measures which are indispensible for securing the ends of the war, and
which are lawful according to the modern laws and usages of war." U.S. WAR DEP'T,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FIELD, General Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863), art. 14, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/11I0?OpenDocument.
100 See Schmitt, supra note 5.
101 The example was a situation where an enemy soldier could be captured instead of killed.
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 78-82. For a contrary view, see W. Hays Parks,
Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Particiation in Hostilities" Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010). Those adopting the contrary view
pointed out that the individual could avoid being killed by the simple act of surrendering,
and that the law of armed conflict prohibition on killing a surrendering soldier was the
appropriate norm to apply in such cases.
102 Additional Protocol I, suprTa note 8, art. 52(2)
'os Id., arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(iii).
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have surrendered or are otherwise hors de combat.104 Taking these
observations together, the result is that military necessity has little or no
independent valence when assessing the legality of autonomous weapon
systems or their use.
4. Feasible Precautions in Attack
Another central component of the principle of distinction is the law
of armed conflict requirement that an attacker take precautions in attack to
minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.10 Set forth in Article 57 of
Additional Protocol I, the rule, which reflects customary international law,
requires an attacker to exercise "constant care . . . to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects."' 06 The article goes on to
articulate the means by which this obligation is to be carried out. In
particular, an attacker is required to "do everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are
not subject to special protection but are military objectives"; cancel an
attack if it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be
breached; provide "effective advance warning" of an attack if it may affect
the civilian population, "unless circumstances do not permit"; "[w]hen a
choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar
military advantage, [select] that the attack on which may be expected to
cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects"; and "take all
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a
104 Id., art. 41; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9,
Rule 47.
105 See generally A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD, ch. 5 (3d. ed., 2012).
106 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 57(1). See also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rule 15; COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra
note 9, 8.1. Other treaty instruments include the requirement. See Second Protocol to the
Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, art. 7(b), Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; Protocol (to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on May 3,
1996, art. 3(10), 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, art. 3(4), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S.
168.
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view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects." 0 7
Each of these obligations applies fully to the use of autonomous
weapon systems. The requirement to do everything feasible to verify that
the target is a military objective would, for example, require full use of on-
board or external sensors capable of boosting the reliability of target
identification. In fact, some scholars have suggested that sensors and
targeting programs for autonomous weapon systems must at least be
"comparable" to that of manned or remotely piloted aircraft. 0 8
Furthermore, an autonomous weapon system could not be used in isolation
if additional external means of identifying the target would measurably
improve identification and their use was militarily feasible in the
circumstances. As an illustration, such a situation might present itself if an
unmanned aerial system could be used to narrow down the location of
enemy forces before the autonomous weapon system is launched into that
area. This would reduce the likelihood of the system's misidentification of
civilians as combatants.
The fulcrum of the verification requirement is the term "feasible."
Feasible has been interpreted as that which is "practicable or practically
possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, including
humanitarian and military considerations." 09 Military considerations
107 Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 57 (2)-(3); see also CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, Rules 16-21. On Article 57, see AP
COMMENTARY, supra note 54, 2184-2238; BOTHE, supra note 54, at 359-369. One
commentator has curiously opined that "the principle of precaution would dictate that
belligerents not field autonomous combat robots as a means of warfare because the
prospects for avoidance or minimisation of incidental injury to or loss of civilian life or
damage to civilian objects could simply not be gauged in the feasibility calculation."
Herbach, supra note 93, at 19. The authors agree with neither his analysis of the facts nor
the law in this regard.
0 8 AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, Rule 39, T 4.
109 Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, art. 3(10), 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; U.K.
Statement made upon Ratification of Additional Protocols I and II, at (b), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAW OF WAR 510 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed.
2000) [hereinafter Ratification Statement]. See also COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note
9, 8.3.1; CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9,
commentary accompanying Rule 15; AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, Rule
1lq).
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include both technical and operational factors, in particular the survivability
of the weapon system and any associated systems or personnel involved in
its employment. Feasibility is an issue of reasonableness. The law of armed
conflict would only require an attacker to assume greater risk to avoid
collateral damage if a reasonable attacker in the same or similar
circumstances would do so. Thus, in the previous example, if sending an
unmanned aerial system into the area of operations could place it at a
degree of risk not justified by the extent of enhanced identification
capability, then its use would not be feasible. This might be because the
aerial system is needed for operations elsewhere against targets of greater
military value or because its use in other operations may have a greater
prospect for the avoidance of civilian casualties.
A requirement to select among military objectives to minimize
civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects likewise applies to
autonomous weapon systems. As an example, an autonomous weapon
system could not be employed to attack electrical substations if attacking
transmission lines was militarily feasible, would achieve the same military
objective (such as temporarily disrupting enemy command and control
during friendly operations), and placed civilians and civilian objects at less
risk.
However, it is the requirement to select the means of warfare likely
to cause the least harm to civilians and civilian objects without sacrificing
military advantage that is the key to the controversy over autonomous
weapon systems. Indeed, it is the oft-ignored linchpin to various other
weaponry controversies, such as that surrounding the use of unmanned
aerial combat systems. Consider the practical implications of this
prescriptive norm. If the use of an autonomous weapon system can be
expected to cause greater collateral damage than a human controlled
system, and using the human controlled system will not lower the
probability of mission success or pose a significant risk to the human
operator, use of the autonomous weapon system would be forbidden as a
matter of law. Restated, the only situation in which an autonomous weapon
system can lawfully be employed is when its use will realize military
objectives that cannot be attained by other readily available systems that
would cause less collateral damage. Of course, there is a fair degree of
elasticity in application of the norm given that it is based on the feasibility of
the competing systems' use. Nevertheless, the norm should significantly
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temper the concerns of those who would prophylactically prohibit use of
autonomous weapon systems.
Indeed, contemplate the consequences of prohibiting autonomous
weapon systems completely. What critics miss is that an autonomous
weapon system may be able to achieve a military objective with less risk of
collateral damage than a human controlled system. For example, an
autonomous weapon system could be armed with non-lethal weapons
unavailable on available manned systems, its sensor suite could be more
precise or discriminate than available manned systems, or its decision-
making capability could be better than that of a human in a particular
environment (such as a very dangerous or rapidly changing one). If the use
of the human controlled system in question comports with the rule of
proportionality, it would be lawful for an attacker to use it in the absence of
the autonomous weapon system because such systems had been banned.
Therefore, the prohibition would actually place civilians and civilian
property at greater risk of incidental harm than if the autonomous weapon
system had been available to the attacker.
5. Doubt
As with human identification, autonomous weapon systems may be
unable to identify a particular person or object as a combatant or civilian, or
military objective or civilian object, with absolute certainty. For instance, an
autonomous weapon system may lack the cognitive or sensor capability to
positively identify a target in the particular circumstances, as might be the
case with its employment in a cluttered battlespace or an electronic warfare
intense environment. Determining how the systems must handle such
uncertainty is essential in light of the prohibition on attacking civilians and
civilian objects, the protection afforded civilians and civilian objects by the
rule of proportionality, and the requirement to take precautions in attack to
minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects.
Law of armed conflict norms as to doubt apply fully in the
autonomous weapons context.110 During an attack, doubt as to status of a
person must be resolved in favor of treating that individual as a civilian.
Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I codifies this presumption, which is
110 "The standards .. ,. regarding doubt apply equally to . .. autonomous or manned
[attacks] ." AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 9, Rule 39, 5.
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generally characterized as customary in nature.111 The presumption applies
both to doubt regarding the status of a targeted individual and as to whether
a person is to be considered a civilian in making proportionality calculations
and taking feasible precautions in attack.
Mere existence of some doubt does not bring the presumption into
operation." 2 Rather, the degree of doubt that bars attack is that which
would cause a reasonable attacker in the same or similar circumstances to
hesitate before attacking. Restated, attackers must act responsibly as a
matter of law when conducting military operations. They must consider
"the information from all sources which is reasonably available to them at
the relevant time,"1 13 as well as factors like force protection, the military
value of the target, and the likelihood that subsequent opportunities to
conduct an attack will present themselves.
The fact that the doubt threshold is framed in terms of human
reasonableness complicates translation into the autonomy context.
However, as a rule of thumb, an autonomous weapon system should not be
permitted to engage a target in situations in which a reasonable attacker
would elect not to attack because of the degree of uncertainty. In other
words, if all information available to the autonomous weapon system from
its sensors and other sources were available to a reasonable human attacker,
would he or she engage the target or not?
Obviously, development of algorithms that can both precisely meter
doubt and reliably factor in the particular situation in which the
autonomous weapon system is being operated will prove highly challenging.
Nevertheless, algorithms could theoretically attribute values to sensor data,
thereby enabling the autonomous weapon system to compute doubt (or,
since it is a machine, the likelihood of being a lawful target). For instance,
autonomous weapon systems could be equipped with sensors that enable
them to determine when a target is possibly a child (for example, based on
size). Such a determination would substantially decrease the probability that
III "In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a
civilian." Additional Protocol I, supra note 9, art. 50(1). See also CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW STUDY, supra note 9, commentary accompanying
Rule 6; AP COMMENTARY, supra note 54, 1911-1921; BOTHE, supra note 54, at 295-
296.
112 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, commentary accompanying Rule 33.
"13 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THEJOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT,JSP 383 (2004), 5.3.4. See also Ratification Statement, supra note 109, (h).
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the target is a combatant. On the other hand, if the sensors ascertain that a
potential target is carrying a weapon or engaging in hostilities (for instance,
by launching a missile or firing a weapon), the likelihood of the target being
a combatant increases. These are overly simplistic examples offered for the
sake of illustration; the actual sensor capabilities of autonomous weapon
systems would likely be much more advanced.
Even if values can be attributable to such variables, it will still be
necessary to set the doubt threshold at which an autonomous weapon
system will refrain from attack. In a sense, doing so will resemble
programming autonomous weapon systems to refrain from attack because
of the risk of violating the proportionality rule. Although it is challenging, it
is possible to envision how this might be done. For instance, the system
could be programmed using the doubt values just discussed; it would not
attack if a particular level of doubt were reached. The system could not be
used in situations in which the pre-programmed threshold would be
"unreasonable." For instance, more doubt can be countenanced on a "hot"
battlefield than in a relatively benign environment. In light of the pre-set
doubt values, it might only be reasonable to employ the system in the
former situation.
An autonomous weapon system may also have adjustable doubt
thresholds that can be set before launch to account for the circumstances in
which it will be employed (for example, for use in an area where enemy
forces have been highly active as distinct from one where they have not).
Advanced autonomous weapon systems of the future will possibly be
capable of being adjusted remotely while operations are underway to
account for unexpected developments, such as intelligence reports of
displaced civilians in the area. Systems may even be developed that can
adapt sua sponte to pre-programmed variables, such as the movement of
vehicles towards or away from friendly forces. Greater doubt would be
acceptable in the former case.
Autonomous weapon systems arguably possess advantages over
humans with respect to doubt. As with other unmanned systems, they are
not constrained by the notion of self-preservation. Therefore, the systems
could, in some conceivable circumstances, be programmed to either hold
their fire until being fired upon or essentially sacrifice themselves to "reveal
the presence of a combatant."I14 Such tactics could greatly reduce the
114 ARKIN, suprTa note 26, at 46.
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degree of doubt before striking a target. Similarly, consider automatic
"hack-back" measures. When an intrusion into the autonomous weapon
system's computers is noted, a clear warning could be issued. If the intrusion
continues after being afforded an opportunity to desist, there is a higher
likelihood that the intrusion has been intentionally conducted by a
combatant or a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities, thereby
making it more reasonable for the autonomous weapon system to mount an
automatic hack-back attack on the originator.i11
No equivalent presumption regarding doubt exists in the lex scripta
for objects. Still, it is clear that an attack based on an unreasonable
conclusion that an object is a military objective violates the law of armed
conflict. Additionally, Article 52(3) of Additional Protocol I sets forth a
separate rule with regard to objects normally dedicated to civilian purposes:
"In case of doubt whether [such] an object . . . is being used to make an
effective contribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so
used."1 6 Some difference of opinion exists over whether this presumption
reflects customary law.' '17In light of that disagreement, one key
commentary on the law of armed conflict takes the admittedly tautological
position that in case of doubt such an object may only be attacked
"following a careful assessment."118 This is a distinction without a
difference. Reduced to basics, as a general rule the mode of analysis
described above for persons would apply equally to objects.
6. Subjectivity
A few scholars have questioned whether an autonomous weapon
system must be capable of making subjective determinations in order to be
lawful.119 Subjectivity permeates application of the prescriptive norms
115 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, Rule 66 and accompanying commentary.
116 On Article 52(3), see AP COMMENTARY, supra note 54, 2029-2037; BOTHE, supra note
54, at 326-327.
117See CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDY, supra note 9, commentary
accompanying Rule 10.
118 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 9, Rule 40 and accompanying commentary.
119 Tony Gillespie & Robin West, Requirementsfor Autonomous Unmanned Air Systems Set by Legal
Issues, 4(2) INT'L C2J. 1,13 (2010); Herbach, supra note 93, at 17; Markus Wagner, The
Dehumanization ofInternational Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical and Political Implications of
Autonomous Weapon Sstems (April 22, 2012), http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-
content/uploads/20 12/01/WagnerDehumanization of international humanitarian law
.pdf.
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discussed above. For instance, proportionality, calculations require
subjective determinations as to the "value" of the anticipated military
advantage to be gained from an attack and the civilian harm expected to be
caused, as well as the point at which the latter is excessive in light of the
former. Implementing the requirement to take precautions in attack
requires subjective determinations as to the feasibility of verification
measures and the availability of alternative targets, weapons, and tactics.
Ascertaining the degree of doubt regarding the identity of a target or of
objects or persons that might become collateral damage is subjective in
nature, as is setting the point where sufficient doubt exists to make an
engagement unreasonable.
Despite potential advances in artificial intelligence, autonomous
weapons systems will be unlikely to be capable of performing such subjective
evaluations for the foreseeable future. This reality has led some to conclude
that autonomous systems as a class cannot therefore comply with the law of
armed conflict.120 This conclusion is unfounded. In an attack involving
autonomous weapon systems, these and other targeting decisions remain
subjective and continue to be made by humans. What may differ is the
phase in the targeting process when the subjective determinations occur. An
autonomous engagement must be conceptualized somewhat differently than
one controlled by a human when considering the issue of subjectivity, but it
can still meet the requirements of the law.
The first point where human subjectivity enters the process is when
the autonomous weapon system is programmed. For non-adjustable
systems, this occurs during development. For adjustable systems, it may
occur either before launch or remotely as the system is underway. In all
these cases, a human has considered relevant variables and made a
subjective determination as to a threshold beyond which the system will not
attack its target. The human then subjectively assigns numerical or other
values to variables that the system's software can assess; qualitative decisions
have been translated into quantitative engagement criteria.
120 Markus Wagner states that because of proportionality and distinction concerns,
autonomous weapon systems can only be "employed in the rarest of circumstances" and
that their "potential deployment is limited to such an extent as to render them useless."
Wagner, supra note 119, at 5. Jonathan Herbach states that "humans in the loop could be
the only way to ensure the basic ability to adhere" to the rules with respect to subjectivity.
Herbach, sup ra note 93, at 17.
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The objective decisions the autonomous weapon systems make do
not replace the subjective ones required under the law. Rather, the objective
decisions reached by the autonomous system merely set "shut-down
criteria" for when the system is either to disengage or seek additional
guidance from a human operator. If, for example, an autonomous weapon
system objectively determines that a possible attack will exceed its
established parameters for collateral damage, it would not mount the attack.
These parameters are more analogous to Rules of Engagement (ROE) with
which the autonomous weapon system must comply than to legal
thresholds. Like ROE for human operations, policy and operational
concerns may result in much more stringent thresholds for engagement than
would be allowed by the law of armed conflict.121 Indeed, thresholds can be
expected to be set high if for no other reason than the absence of a human
in the loop.
The decisive juncture with respect to subjectivity is when the
commander (or authorized officer) orders the autonomous weapon system
into battle. He or she must make a subjective decision to do so based upon
the attendant circumstances. This requires an understanding not only of the
physical capabilities and limitations of the system (the maximum range, the
effectiveness of the weaponry, the blast radius of its weapons, etc.), but also
the subjective values embedded in it. Ideally, the commander would be able
to dial those values up or down as deemed appropriate to the given
circumstances. If that is not an option, the commander must subjectively
determine whether the autonomous weapon will perform lawfully in the
particular battlespace given its preprogramed values.
Ultimately, the reasonableness of the commander's decision to
employ the autonomous weapon system is measured against the legal
requirements. Many factors will determine whether the decision was
reasonably made. How many variables present in the battlespace could the
autonomous weapon system evaluate? With what accuracy? How static or
dynamic was the environment? Were the programmed thresholds of
proportionality and precautions appropriate for the environment? How
much doubt was present in the environment? Did the programmed
parameters appropriately account for that doubt?
121 Some commentators have called for ethical brakes to be designed into autonomous
weapon systems. MichaelJ. Barnes & A. William Evans III, Soldier-Robot Teams in Future
Battlefields. An Overview, in HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS IN FUTURE MILITARY
OPERATIONS 9, 23 (Michael Barnes & FlorianJentsch eds., 2010).
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A particularly critical issue to be considered is time. During the
targeting cycle for human operated systems, subjective decisions about the
environment and the lawfulness of a lethal strike can sometimes be made up
to the moment of impact.122 For autonomous weapon systems, sensors may
continuously feed data about the environment to the system that affects the
system's decision to attack based on the programmed subjective parameters.
But in most cases the engagement parameters are fixed once the system is
launched or, for those systems that can be adjusted remotely during a
mission, when the system is no longer capable of having its inputted
"subjective values" adjusted.123 The longer the time since the last human
programming, the greater the risk of attack results that the commander did
not anticipate and therefore the less reasonable the decision to employ the
autonomous weapon system generally becomes. For instance, a system may
be programmed in part based on "pattern of life analysis" of the target
area. 124 However, patterns of life change over time. This could mean that
the programmed parameters are based on out-dated pattern of life analysis
at the time the autonomous weapon system conducts an attack.
The summary point regarding subjectivity is that humans, not the
autonomous weapon systems, will continue to make the subjective
determinations resident in the law of armed conflict, at least absent
revolutionary change in artificial intelligence capabilities. Thus, it is
somewhat misleading to label the systems "human out of the loop." And it is
certainly wrong to assert that the fact that the autonomous weapon system
itself cannot make subjective determinations necessarily renders
autonomous weapon systems unlawful.
122 For instance, an air-launched AGM-129A has a range of up to 2,000 miles and
therefore its employment often involves a significant flight time. U.S. Air Force, AGM-
129A Advanced Cruise Missile (Jan. 17, 2011),
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3548.
123 It is less likely that systems that operate underwater or in areas where communications
jamming is prevalent will be able to have their subjective values adjusted during a mission.
Commanders who know in advance that the systems will be operating in such
environments should recognize that the last opportunity to provide subjective decision
making will most likely be the moment of launch.
124 U.S. ARMY, THE TARGETING PROCESS, FM 3-60, Nov. 26, 2010, at B-3 & B-4.
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7. Policy Restrictions
Some states are beginning to set forth autonomous weapon systems
guidelines that are meant to foster compliance with the law of armed
conflict and achieve other objectives, such as avoiding mistaken
engagements. For instance, the current U.S. policy, which distinguishes
between semi-autonomous weapon systems, human-supervised autonomous
weapon systems, and autonomous weapon systems, provides:
(1) Semi-autonomous weapon systems (including manned or
unmanned platforms, munitions, or sub-munitions that function as
semi-autonomous weapon systems or as subcomponents of semi-
autonomous weapon systems) may be used to apply lethal or non-
lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic force. Semi-autonomous weapon
systems that are onboard or integrated with unmanned platforms
must be designed such that, in the event of degraded or lost
communications, the system does not autonomously select and
engage individual targets or specific target groups that have not been
previously selected by an authorized human operator.
(2) Human-supervised autonomous weapon systems may be used to
select and engage targets, with the exception of selecting humans as
targets, for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or
saturation attacks for:
(a) Static defense of manned installations.
(b) Onboard defense of manned platforms.
(3) Autonomous weapon systems may be used to apply non-lethal,
non-kinetic force, such as some forms of electronic attack, against
materiel targets in accordance with [applicable directives]. 121
The policy acknowledges that autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon
systems might be intended for use in a manner falling outside these policies.
In such cases, it mandates high-level approval before formal development
and then again before fielding the system.126 This requirement is in addition
125 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 18, 4c.
126 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 18, 5d. Approval by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required. Prior to formal
development the following are required:
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(1) The system design incorporates the necessary capabilities to allow commanders
and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of
force.
(2) The system is designed to complete engagements in a timeframe consistent with
commander and operator intentions and, if unable to do so, to terminate
engagements or seek additional human operator input before continuing the
engagement.
(3) The system design, including safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and
information assurance. . . addresses and minimizes the probability or
consequences of failures that could lead to unintended engagements or to loss of
control of the system.
(4) Plans are in place for [verification and validation] and [test and evaluation] to
establish system reliability, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions,
including possible adversary actions, to a sufficient standard consistent with the
potential consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of control of the
system.
(5) A preliminary legal review of the weapon system has been completed, in
coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. .. and in
accordance with [the relevant policy guidance].
Id., encl 3, la. Before fielding, the review must assess:
(1) System capabilities, human-machine interfaces, doctrine, TTPs, and training
have demonstrated the capability to allow commanders and operators to exercise
appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force and to employ systems
with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties,
weapon system safety rules, and applicable ROE.
(2) Sufficient safeties, anti-tamper mechanisms, and information assurance in
accordance with Reference (a) have been implemented to minimize the
probability or consequences of failures that could lead to unintended engagements
or to loss of control of the system.
(3) V&V and T&E assess system performance, capability, reliability, effectiveness,
and suitability under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions,
consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or loss of
control of the system.
(4) Adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed,
and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning,
capabilities, and limitations of the system's autonomy in realistic operational
conditions.
(5) System design and human-machine interfaces are readily understandable to
trained operators, provide traceable feedback on system status, and provide clear
procedures for trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions.
(6) A legal review of the weapon system has been completed, in coordination with
the [the DoD General Counsel and relevant policy guidance].
Id., encl. 3, lb.
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to the legal review requirements set forth below. As autonomous weapon
system capabilities improve, policy restrictions will evolve in lock step.
C. Legal Review ofAutonomous Weapon Systems
Since the prospect of autonomous weapon systems is so new, the
requirement to conduct a review of their legality looms large.127 Codified in
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, the rule provides that "in the study,
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of
warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited
by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the
High Contracting Party." 28 Means of warfare are weapons and weapon
systems, whereas method of warfare refers to the tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) by which hostilities are conducted. An autonomous
weapon system is a means of warfare. Employing a swarm of autonomous
weapon systems to conduct, for example, a siege by targeting all vehicular
traffic into or out of a populated area illustrates their use as a method of
warfare.
While some commentators suggest that a disagreement exists as to
whether Article 36 restates customary international law,129 the obligation to
conduct legal reviews of new means of warfare before their use is generally
considered, and correctly so, reflective of customary international law. 30
Consensus is lacking as to whether an analogous requirement exists to
perform legal reviews of new methods of warfare. 's'
States that are Party to Additional Protocol I are clearly required to
conduct a legal review of both the autonomous weapon system and any
TTP that its user develops. Non-Party States are arguably only bound by
the obligation to review the system itself in light of its envisaged usage. The
authors are of the opinion that both reviews, whether or not legally
mandated, are well advised whenever feasible.
127 On weapons review generally, see BOOTHBY, supra note 50, at 340-352; W. Hays Parks,
Conventional Weapons and Weapons Reviews, 8 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 55 (2005).
128 On Article 36, see AP COMMENTARY, supra note 54, 1463-1482; BOTHE, supra note
54, at 199-201.
129 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 21.
130 See, for example, its treatment as such in AMW MANUAL COMMENTARY, supra note 9,
Rule 9, and the TALLINN MANUAL, suprTa note 9, Rule 48.
131 See discussion in TALLINN MANUAL, suprTa note 9, commentary accompanying Rule 48.
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For States Party to Additional Protocol I, it is clear from the plain
text of Article 36 that legal reviews "should take place at the earliest stage
possible and continue through any development that proceeds." 3 2 Because
there is no corresponding customary international humanitarian law
requirement, non-Party States, such as the United States, are only required
to ensure weapons are lawful before use. Nevertheless, early legal reviews
can shape the development stage of a weapon system and resultantly avoid
the unnecessary effort and cost associated with components and capabilities
that may not pass legal muster. It is U.S. policy to conduct two legal
reviews, once prior to taking the decision to enter into formal development,
and again before an autonomous weapon system is fielded. 3 3
Legal reviews are required for both individual weapons and weapons
systems. Autonomous weapon systems critics have questioned the United
States' commitment to conduct reviews on both. Putting aside individual
cases where the United States may or may not have complied with the
requirement for legal reviews, it is presently U.S. policy to review both
weapons and weapon systems. This obligation is unambiguously confirmed
in a Department of Defense directive which provides that:
The acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and
weapon systems shall be consistent with all applicable
domestic law and treaties and international agreements ...
customary international law, and the law of armed conflict.
... An attorney authorized to conduct such legal reviews in
the Department shall conduct the legal review of the intended
acquisition of weapons or weapons systems.134
Modifications of weapon systems can trigger additional requirements to
conduct legal reviews. Given that "some robotic technology, while not
132 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 22.
133 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 18, encl. 3, la(5) and lb(6). Additional U.S.
policy guidance on legal reviews is contained in DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5000.01, The
DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM (May 12, 2003) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.01];
DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5000.02, OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION
SYSTEM (Dec. 8, 2008); DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.03, POLICY FOR NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS July 9,1996); and DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 2311.01JE, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM (May 9, 2006).
134 DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.01, supra note 133, encl. 1, £1.1 .15. (emphasis added).
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inherently harmful, has the potential one day to be weaponized," 3 this
issue is of particular concern. A fair reading of the law of armed conflict
norm is that any significant modification to a weapon system requires legal
review. The United States agrees. For example, the U.S. Air Force policy on
weapon reviews specifically mandates "a timely legal review of all weapons
and cyber capabilities, whether a new weapon or cyber capability at an
early stage of the acquisition process, or a contemplated modification of an
existing weapon or cyber capability, to ensure legality under [the law of
armed conflict], domestic law and international law prior to their
acquisition for use in a conflict or other military operation." 36 To
summarize, U.S. policy is to review all weapons, their associated delivery
system, and any significant modification of them. This policy
unquestionably applies to autonomous weapon systems.
The applicable scope of required legal reviews is worth examining
closely. The primary intent of the legal review is to determine whether a
weapon itself is unlawful under international law. Given the technological
advances likely to be embedded in autonomous weapons, this
straightforward task may be challenging. Lawyers conducting the reviews
will need to work closely with computer scientists and engineers to obtain a
better appreciation for the measures of reliability and the testing and
validation methods used on the weapons. 3 7 While significant, these
challenges are substantively similar to those facing reviewers of other
complicated, modern weapon systems, which are routinely being conducted
without fanfare or criticism.
The sole context in a determination of whether the weapon is lawful
per se is its intended, not possible, use. Legal reviews do not generally
consider use issues since they are always contextual by nature.1 38 For
135 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 23.
136 U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTRUCTION 51-402, LEGAL REVIEW OF WEAPONS AND CYBER
CAPABILITIES 1.3.1 July 27, 2011) [hereinafter AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402]
(emphasis added).
137 For a discussion of a "multi-disciplinary approach" to weapons reviews of autonomous
weapons, see Alan Backstrom & Jan Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues 28-35, Oct. 22, 2012,
http:/ /ssrn.com/abstract= 2198826.
138 The Committee Report on the Article presented to the Diplomatic Conference
emphasizes that the rule "is not meant to imply an obligation 'to foresee or analyze all
possible misuse of a weapon, for any weapon can be misused in a way that would be
prohibited.' The meaning of the phrase is to require a determination whether the
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instance, the rule of proportionality does not factor into a weapons review
because compliance depends on the situational risk to civilians and civilian
objects and the anticipated military advantage in the attendant
circumstances. 139 Because the assessment is contextual, it is generally
inappropriate to make ex ante judgments as to a weapon's compliance with
the rule. Only if the weapon system were necessarily employed in situations
where injury to civilians or harm to civilian objects was inevitable and
predictable in scope (as in a cyber malware weapon developed for a
particular attack) would such an assessment have to be made prior to
fielding of the weapon. The requirement that an attacker take feasible
precautions in attack to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects is
likewise context specific and, therefore, any assessment of compliance with
the norm can only occur with respect to its use in particular circumstances,
not as part of the legal review.
By way of illustration, the Air Force guidance delineates those legal
issues that must be examined when determining whether a weapon system
being considered for acquisition is lawful:
3.1.1. Whether there is a specific rule of law, whether by treaty
obligation of the United States or accepted by the United States as
customary international law, prohibiting or restricting the use of the
weapon or cyber capability in question.
3.1.2. If there is no express prohibition, the following questions are
considered:
3.1.2.1. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is calculated
to cause superfluous injury, in violation of Article 23(e) of the
Annex to Hague Convention IV; and
3.1.2.2. Whether the weapon or cyber capability is capable of
being directed against a specific military objective and, if not,
is of a nature to cause an effect on military objectives and
civilians or civilian objects without distinction.140
employmentfor its normal or expected use would be prohibited under some or all
circumstances." BOTHE, supra note 54, at 200-201.
139 BOOTHBY, supra note 50, at 79.
140 AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 51-402, supra note 136, 3.1.1.-3.1.2.2. Note that the
reference to effects in the Air Force guidance covers both immediate effects and those
which spread, thereby encompassing both the situations envisaged in Additional Protocol I,
art. 51(4(b-c).
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The requirements set forth in paragraph 3.1.2 mirror analogous provisions
appearing in Additional Protocol I, all of which are customary in nature. 141
The Air Force guidance's extension of its substantive requirements
to cyber capabilities, a relatively recent revision to the basic document, is
noteworthy. It illustrates the principle that the law of armed conflict's rules
regarding the legality of weapon systems apply fully to weapons that did not
exist at the time a particular treaty norm was crafted or customary law
crystallized.142 It is incontrovertible that all of the norms discussed apply
equally to autonomous weapon systems.
Finally, the interplay between the Martens Clause and legal reviews
bears mention. Human Rights Watch asserts that legal reviews "should
assess a weapon under the Martens Clause," a proposition echoed by the
International Committee of the Red CrOSS.143 The clause originally
appeared in the 1899 Hague Convention II and was subsequently included
in both the 1907 version of that treaty and Additional Protocol I.144 As set
forth in the Protocol, it provides: "In cases not covered by this Protocol or
by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under
the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience." The International Court ofJustice recognizes
the Martens Clause as customary in nature and has observed that it "proved
to be an effective means of addressing rapid evolution of military
technology."45
By its own terms, though, the clause applies only in the absence of
treaty law.146 In other words, it is a failsafe mechanism meant to address
lacunae in the law; it does not act as an overarching principle that must be
considered in every case. Today, a rich fabric of treaty law governs the
legality of weapon systems. Certain of these treaties bear directly on the
141 Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 35(2), 51(4)(b)-(c).
142 See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, T 86.
143 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 25; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL REVIEW OF NEW WEAPONS, MEANS AND METHODS OF
WARFARE 1.2.2.3 (2006),
144 1899 Hague II, supra note 51, pmbl; 1907 Hague IV, supra note 51, pmbl; Additional
Protocol I, supra note 8, art. 1(2).
145 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, 78, 84.
146 The text of the clause refers to "cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements." Additional Protocol I, suprTa note 8, art. 1(2)
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development of autonomous weapon systems. The restrictions on
incendiary weapons, air delivered antipersonnel mines, and cluster
munitions, for example, limit their employment on autonomous weapon
systems by States Party to the respective treaties. 147 As discussed above,
general principles and rules of the law of armed conflict treaty law,
particularly those contained in Additional Protocol I, further restrict
weaponry. Emergence of many customary international humanitarian law
norms since 1899 also measurably diminishes the significance of the clause.
By the turn of the 21st century, the likelihood that future weapon systems,
including autonomous ones, would not violate applicable treaty and
customary law, but nevertheless be unlawful based on the Martens Clause,
had become exceptionally low.
Autonomous weapon systems critics are correct to accentuate the
importance of weapons reviews in the process of developing and fielding
new weaponry. However, it must be cautioned that such reviews examine
only the legality of a weapon system as such, not its use in any particular
circumstance. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the requirement for the
reviews will serve as an impediment to the development of autonomous
weapon systems as a class of weapons.
D. Accountability
Given that fully autonomous weapons represent a somewhat greater
distancing of human operators from the battlefield, issues related to
determining responsibility and assessing accountability for the activities of
these systems are particularly acute. 148 With respect to accountability,
147 Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, Oct. 10,
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol (to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168; Protocol (to
the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects) on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other
Devices as amended on May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 133; Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their
Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997); Convention on Cluster Munitions,
Dec. 3, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357 (2009).
148 Alston, sup ra note 39, at 51 ("One of the most important issues flowing from increased
automation is the question of responsibility for civilian casualties or harm or violations of
the laws of war."). See also Timothy Coughlin, The Future of Robotic Weapony and the Law of
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Human Rights Watch has made the very reasonable point that " [i]f the
killing were done by a fully autonomous weapon . . . the question would
become: whom to hold responsible." The organization concludes that
"[s]ince there is no fair and effective way to assign legal responsibility for
unlawful acts committed by fully autonomous weapons, granting them
complete control over targeting decisions would undermine yet another tool
for promoting civilian protection." 49
The problem with this conclusion is that it is based on a false
premise.15 0 The mere fact that a human might not be in control of a
particular engagement does not mean that no human is responsible for the
actions of the autonomous weapon system.'5 A human must decide how to
program the system and when to launch it. Self-evidently, that individual
would be accountable for programming it to engage in actions that
amounted to war crimes. Moreover, the commander or civilian supervisor
of the person would be accountable for those war crimes if he or she knew
or should have known that the autonomous weapon system had been so
programmed and did nothing to stop its use, or later became aware that the
system had been employed in a manner constituting a war crime and did
nothing to hold the individuals concerned accountable.'1 2
Armed Conflict Irreconcilable Differences?, 17 U. C. LONDONJURISPRUDENCE REV. 67, 86-90
(2011).
149 LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 1, at 42.
150 On accountability, see generally ROGERS, supra note 105, at 360 & ch. 11.
151 See William J. Fenrick, The Prosecution ofInternational Crimes in Relation to the Conduct of
Military Operations, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 501, 505
(Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010).
152 See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (II) for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV)
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; Additional Protocol I, supra note 8, arts. 86-87; Hague Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the
Execution of the Convention, art. 28, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240; Second Protocol to
the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, art. 15(2), Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212; Rome Statute, supra note 9,
arts. 25(3)(b) & 28; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 7(1), S.C. Res. 827 annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 955 annex, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955, (Nov. 8, 1994); Prosecutor v. Blaikil, Case. No. IT-95-14-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, 281-282 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3,
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Hopefully, autonomous weapon systems will never be programmed
to commit war crimes. Much more likely would be a case in which a system
that has not been so programmed is nevertheless used in a manner that
constitutes such crimes. For example, the operator of an autonomous
weapon system that cannot distinguish civilians from combatants who
employs the system in an area where the two are intermingled has
committed the war crime of indiscriminate attack. Any commander or
supervisor who ordered the attack would likewise be criminally responsible
for committing a war crime. So too would a commander or supervisor who
knew the operation was about to be mounted and failed to suppress it or
who later learned of the operation and failed to take action to hold those
responsible accountable.'13
The United States accepts the premise that those involved in
autonomous weapon system operations may be held accountable for their
decisions. In its most recent guidance on the use of the systems, the
Department of Defense has emphasized that "[p]ersons who authorize the
use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semi-autonomous
weapon systems must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with
the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and
applicable rules of engagement."l54 The policy imposes identical
requirements on Commanders of the U.S. Combatant Commands.15
Finally, it is sometimes suggested that individuals who design
autonomous weapon systems might be at risk of being held accountable for
war crimes committed with those systems. This assertion is spurious, at least
to the extent that the system is not specifically designed to commit a war
crime. Instead, only individuals who knowingly use the system, and any
2000); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 605 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR 95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 223 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda May 21, 1999); COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 9, 6.1.3.
153 The law of armed conflict imposes a duty to investigate possible war crimes. Michael N.
Schmitt, Investigating Violations ofInternational Law in Armed Conflict 2 HARV. NAT. SEC.J. 31,
43 (2011).
154 DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.09, supra note 12, T 4b.
155 Id., encl. 4, Ob. The United States has nine Combatant Commands: U.S. Africa
Command (USAFRICOM); U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM); U.S. European
Command (USEUCOM); U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); U.S. Pacific
Command (USPACOM); U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); U.S.
Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM); U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM);
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).
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responsible superiors, may be held accountable under the law of armed
conflict.
Conclusion
Autonomous technology is poised to revolutionize warfare. Nations
will undoubtedly clamour for the weapon systems that this technology will
make possible. However, as with prior technological leaps, those intent on
using autonomous technology in combat must be mindful of the tenets and
teachings of the law of armed conflict-a robust set of laws that exists in a
synergistic relationship to warfare.
Skeptical of the willingness of states to comply with this law, critics of
autonomous weapon systems have embarked on a campaign to pre-
emptively ban lethal autonomous weapons and targeting. Unfortunately, the
effort has failed to capture accurately or adequately the significant legal
issues at stake. This Article has attempted to refocus the debate. In so doing,
four core conclusions emerged.
First, autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful per se. Their
autonomy has no direct bearing on the probability they would cause
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, does not preclude them from
being directed at combatants and military objectives, and need not result in
their having effects that an attacker cannot control. Individual systems could
be developed that would violate these norms, but autonomous weapon
systems are not prohibited on this basis as a category.
Second, the use of autonomous weapon systems in certain
circumstances would be lawful under the law of armed conflict, whereas in
others it would not. This is true of every weapon which is not unlawful per se,
from rocks to rockets. Of course, the fact that autonomous weapon systems
will locate and attack persons and objects without human interaction raises
unique issues. These challenges are not grounds for banning the systems
entirely. On the contrary, the law of armed conflict's restrictions on the use
of weapons (particularly the requirements that they be directed only against
combatants and military objectives, that they not be employed
indiscriminately, that their use not result in excessive harm to civilians or
civilian objects, and that they not be used when other available weapons
could achieve a similar military advantage while placing civilians and
civilian objects at less risk) are suffciently robust to safeguard humanitarian
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values. After all, as the ICRC suggests, "new technologies do not change
existing law, but rather must abide by it."156
Third, humans are never really "out of the loop." While
autonomous weapon systems will increasingly be capable of solving complex
problems, absent dramatic improvements in artificial intelligence, humans
will decide when and where to deploy the system and what parameters to
embed within it. Human operators, not machines or software, will therefore
be making the subjective determinations required under the law of armed
conflict, such as those involved in proportionality or precautions in attack
calculations. Although the subjective decisions may sometimes have to be
made earlier in the targeting cycle than has traditionally been the case, this
neither precludes the lawfulness of the decisions, nor represents an
impediment to the lawful deployment of the systems. Similarly, the
lawfulness of an autonomous weapon system is not undermined simply
because the system itself is incapable of making truly subjective decisions.
Finally, humans will always be accountable for the employment of
autonomous weapon systems. Although they will gradually delegate more
tasks to autonomous systems, the responsibility for the appropriate use of
the systems will nevertheless remain with the human operators and
commanders. Orders to deploy the system and judgments about how to
program it will come from a human. Any recklessness or criminal misuse
will result in accountability through the same war crimes mechanisms that
already exist under the law of armed conflict.
Assuming these conclusions are correct, calls for a ban on
autonomous weapon systems are unlikely to gain much traction with states.
Virtually every rule of the law of armed conflict reflects a balancing by
States of two seminal factors-military necessity and humanitarian
concerns. 15 The result of this dialectic interplay is the law of armed conflict,
either in the form of treaty law that has been negotiated by states based on
156 ICRC REPORT, supra note 10, at 40.
157 As noted in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, the law of armed conflict fixes "the
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of
humanity." St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 51. The humanitarian concerns that are
factored into the equation reflect the interest States have in maximizing the law of armed
conflict's protection of their combatants and civilian population during armed conflict. In
that States are self-interested entities, these concerns are tempered by their desire to retain
the ability to fight effectively in order to achieve national interests.
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their assessment of the balance or customary law derived from state practice
and opiniojuris that reflects the balancing.
Taking this process of norm formulation into account, achieving an
international consensus to prohibit autonomous weapons is highly
implausible. While, as illustrated in the new Department of Defense
directive on autonomous weapon systems, states are sensitive to the
humanitarian implications of the systems, until both their potential for
unintended human consequences and their combat capabilities are better
understood, it is improbable that any state would seriously consider banning
them.15
It would be irresponsible to prohibit autonomous weapons at this
stage in their development. As noted, such weapons may offer the possibility
of attacking the enemy with little risk to the attacker. Although this "value"
has sometimes been criticized with respect to unmanned combat aerial
systems like the Predator, there is no basis in the law of armed conflict for
suggesting that attacking forces must assume risk. Moreover, banning
autonomous weapon systems may, as discussed, have the effect of denying
commanders a valuable tool for minimizing the risk to civilians and civilian
objects in certain attack scenarios. Until they are better understood, it would
be naively premature to draw definitive legal, moral, and operational
conclusions as to the use of autonomous weapon systems.
158 There is little historical precedent for banning weaponry before it has been fielded. The
only contemporary example is the ban on permanently blinding lasers, one that deprived
States of very little militarily because temporarily blinding lasers can generally serve the
same military purpose as the former. See Additional Protocol to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be
deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380
U.N.T.S. 370.
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